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Abstract 
 
Firms compete against rivals having abilities and resources that are different from their 
own. I present a simple model of spatial competition that predicts two rivals will be (1) 
more likely to differentiate their products when the gap between their abilities is large, 
and (2) less likely to differentiate when the market size ratio between product segments is 
large. I test the predictions in the Chinese national television industry which is occupied 
by a dominant incumbent and thirty-one newly entered satellite channels. My 
identification strategy exploits a natural experiment induced by a government policy 
change that led the incumbent to shift its product location. I find the entrants position 
themselves on average 12 to 15 percent further away from the incumbent than from 
peers. Moreover, I find the entrants dynamically adjust their positions to differentiate 
from the incumbent. The weakest entrants exhibit greatest responsiveness to the 
incumbent’s actions. Finally, I find the entrants locate closer to the incumbent in 
timeslots where the market size ratio between product segments is large. This study 
contributes to a richer understanding of spatial competition strategy by examining a set of 
conditions under which rivals exhibit different degrees of differentiation. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms face competitors with abilities and resources that are different from their own. For 
example, new players compete with incumbents who have entrenched capabilities and 
complementary assets (Teece 1986, Tripsas 1997); de novo entrants compete with de alio 
entrants who have superior technical knowledge (Klepper and Simons 2000); and fringe 
players compete with dominant players who have market shaping powers (de Figueiredo 
and Silverman 2007). How players strategically position themselves with respect to their 
stronger rivals will influence their future performance. 
The literature on spatial positioning relative to rivals primarily discusses three 
strategies – stay close, differentiate and maintain distances from competitors. Staying 
close to rivals brings to the firm benefits of information acquisition and maintaining 
competitive parity (Lieberman and Asaba 2006). However, a differentiation strategy 
allows the firm to mitigate direct competitions which erode profits (Porter 1980). 
Research on maintaining optimal distances from competitors suggests that the firm needs 
to balance the costs and benefits of staying close versus differentiation strategies 
(Deephouse 1999). Considerable empirical studies exist on spatial positioning in 
geographical (e.g. Baum and Haveman 1997 on hotel locations in Manhattan, Greve 2000 
on bank locations in Tokyo), product (e.g. Thomas and Weigelt 2000 on automobiles) 
and service (e.g. Semadeni 2006 on management consultancy) markets. Yet spatial 
competition strategy by firms with distinct ability differences remains relatively 
unexplored.
1 
                                                 
1 The study by Semadeni (2006) takes an exploratory approach to investigate positioning between firms 
with different sets of attributes because “there is little established literature in this area from which 
hypotheses might be generated” (p.170).  Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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This paper studies spatial competition among players with heterogeneous abilities 
using data from the Chinese satellite television industry that consists of a dominant 
incumbent and thirty-one entrants. To present my argument, I begin with a simple model 
on product spatial positioning by firms with heterogeneous abilities. The model builds on 
recent advances in the economics literature on spatial competition and contests with 
heterogeneous players (Vogel 2008, Brown 2008) and is adapted to the media 
broadcasting industry. The model predicts that two rivals will (1) more likely to 
differentiate their products when the gap between their abilities is large, and (2) less 
likely to differentiate when the market size ratio between product segments is large.  
Analyzing a panel dataset of the Chinese satellite television industry, I show that a 
player’s product proximity to a competitor is influenced by their relative heterogeneity in 
ability. I find the entrants position themselves about 12 to 15 percent further away from 
the dominant incumbent than from peers. Extending the analysis further, I exploit a 
natural experiment induced by a government policy change that led the dominant 
incumbent to shift position in the product space. I examine the post-policy repositioning 
activities of the entrants to identify their spatial positioning strategy. I find that 
subsequent to the incumbent’s programming shift, the entrants reposition themselves 
further away from the incumbent if the latter has moved closer to them in programming 
space, and do not reposition themselves closer to the incumbent if the latter has moved 
away from them. This pattern of asymmetric response is consistent with the 
differentiation strategy but contradicts the staying close and maintaining distance 
strategies. In addition, I examine how variations in ability among the entrants influence 
their strategic response to the dominant incumbent. I find that, compared to their more Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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able peers, less able entrants are more sensitive in differentiating from the dominant 
incumbent. Finally, I compare the strategic behaviors in timeslots during the day and in 
the evening. I find the entrants demonstrate a lesser degree of differentiation in the 
evening when the market size ratio between program genres is large. The empirical 
findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
This study contributes to a richer understanding of spatial competition strategy by 
examining a set of conditions under which rivals exhibit different degrees of 
differentiation. Specifically, this study adds to the literature in three ways. First, I focus 
on the scenario where players possess heterogeneous abilities – a common phenomenon 
in markets following technological breakthroughs and in newly deregulated industries 
(Tushman and Anderson 1986, Walker et al. 2002). The Chinese satellite television 
industry offers a suitable setting for this study. The industry consists of a dominant 
incumbent which enjoyed monopoly over the national television market until advances in 
communications technology enabled the entrance of satellite channels. Moreover, the 
dominant incumbent is owned by the resource-rich central government while the new 
entrants are each backed by a single provincial government. The heterogeneity in ability 
between the incumbent and the entrants is clearly evident. By integrating firm ability with 
market environment, I offer a richer theoretical framework for analyzing spatial 
competitive strategy. Second, I examine spatial competition in a setting where price 
competition is constrained – the television channels in this study are primarily supported 
by advertising revenues and do not charge the audience.
 While much prior research 
examines industries where firms compete along both spatial and price dimensions, I 
develop and test a model that predicts the spatial competitive mechanism absent of price Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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competition. The model could be adapted to spatial competition in other two-sided 
industries, such as advertiser-supported internet search engines. Third, I employ a natural 
experiment to strengthen my empirical identification. A government policy change that 
occurred during my observation period led the dominant firm to relocate in product 
space. By examining the pattern of post-policy repositioning activity of the satellite 
channels, I distinguish the differentiation strategy from the staying close and maintaining 
distance strategies. Furthermore, the policy shock and the repositioning activity occurred 
in a short time period, which helps to isolate spatial competition effects from underlying 
changes in consumer taste trends.  
Empirical testing of spatial competition theory with heterogeneous firms is 
particularly susceptible to two issues: (1) sample selection and (2) spatial mobility 
problems. I exploit the institutional setting of the Chinese satellite television industry to 
mitigate both issues. With regard to the sample selection issue, weak firms are less likely 
to participate in the market and therefore their product offering and prices are 
unobserved. For example, the study by Syverson (2007) on spatial competition in the 
cement industry finds that competition-driven selection on cost to be a significant 
underlying cause for his observed firm strategy.
2 In my study, all thirty-one provincial 
television stations in China are licensed to participate in satellite broadcasting. No new 
entry or exit occurred during the period of examination. This institutional setting helps 
alleviate the sample selection issue. As to the spatial mobility issue, if relocation is highly 
costly, it could prevent the weakest players from switching location and therefore they 
                                                 
2 Syverson (2007) uses census level data on cost, prices and geographical spatial location to analyze the 
ready-mixed concrete industry. He finds that equilibrium prices are lower in areas where players 
concentrate. If the players were assumed homogeneous, one might be tempted to conclude that competition 
leads to lower optimal mark ups. However, when Syverson includes cost data to reflect firm heterogeneity, 
he finds competition-driven selection on cost to be an underlying cause for the low equilibrium prices. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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have no choice but to remain stationary or exit the market. For example, the study by de 
Figueiredo and Silverman (2007) examines the strategic behaviors of fringe players in the 
laser printer industry when the dominant player repositions itself in product space. In the 
laser printer industry, technical barriers across products might prevent the less capable 
players from relocating in product space, thus leading to market exit instead of spatial 
repositioning. Unlike such industries, the media broadcasting industry generally poses 
lower barriers to switching program genres. Sweeting (2007) estimates that repositioning 
costs, while high, are not large enough to prevent U.S. radio broadcasters from switiching 
formats. 
A number of empirical studies have examined the U.S. advertiser-support media 
broadcast industry; however, due to the industry structure of U.S. radio and television 
broadcasting, these studies examine firms that possess comparable abilities.  Greve 
(1996, 1998) finds mimetic diffusion of new market positions across geographic markets 
in the U.S. commercial radio industry. Berry and Waldfogel (2001) examine U.S. radio 
merger activity through the public policy lens and find that format repositioning is 
consistent with strategic spatial preemption behavior. Studies on the U.S. television 
network yield varied results. Tiedge and Ksobiech (1987) analyze primetime 
programming of the U.S. television networks and find evidence supporting horizontal 
differentiation. However, Kennedy (2002) finds U.S. television networks imitate one 
another when launching new program genres. 
This study is not without limitations. First, the dataset contains only government-
owned broadcasters. Prior research has documented that state-owned enterprises may not 
be as responsive to market competitive forces as private firms are (World Bank 1995). In Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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China there is no comparable privately-held broadcaster to offer a benchmark. Second, 
this study focuses on analyzing the pairwise competitions between each entrant and the 
incumbent. In practice, the entrants also take into consideration the actions of their peers 
when deciding on where to position in the product space. I discuss the implications of 
these issues in the final section of the paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of spatial 
competition with heterogeneous players adapted to the media broadcasting industry and 
states the main testable predictions; Section 3 describes the institutional background of 
the Chinese satellite television industry; Section 4 discusses the data and empirical 
methodology; Section 5 presents the results; Section 6 concludes. 
   
2. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Media Broadcasters 
I present a model of spatial competition strategy adapted to the advertiser-supported 
media industry. The model builds on recent advances in the economics literature on 
spatial competition and contests (Vogel 2008, Brown 2008) with heterogeneous players. 
Suppose there are two television channels that select the program genre and 
quality of their shows. Channel 1, the more able channel, produces θ ∈ (1, 2) units of 
quality per dollar spent. Channel 2, the less able channel, produces 1 unit of quality per 
dollar spent. There are two genres. One genre attracts a larger audience and generates 
revenue at β   where β > 1 is a scale multiplier and q represents the total quality of 
shows produced for this genre. The other genre attracts a smaller audience and 
corresponds to a scale multiplier of 1, all else equal. When both channels select the same Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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genre (i.e. co-locate), they split the total revenue according to q1/(q1+q2) and q2/(q1+q2). 
Otherwise, each monopolizes the revenue of their genres.
3 
In equilibrium, when both channels co-locate in the more attractive genre they 
earn
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Proposition There exist three equilibria under the following conditions: 
Condition (1): Suppose      
 
 
      
        , then the unique equilibrium is for both 
channels to co-locate in the genre with the larger audience. 
Condition (2): Suppose 
 
 
      
              
 
 
      
        , then the unique equilibrium is 
where the more able channel selects the genre with the larger audience and the less able 
channel selects the genre with the smaller audience. 
Condition (3): Suppose     
 
 
      
        , then the channels never co-locate in 
equilibrium. Moreover, either channel may select the genre with the larger audience. 
                                                 
3 This model builds on the literature on spatial competition (Vogel 2008), contests with heterogeneous 
players (Brown 2008), and contests where the prize increases with aggregate efforts (Chung 1996). Three 
assumptions in the model are specific to the advertiser-supported media broadcasting industry: (1) There is 
no marginal cost in serving an additional audience, (2) the channels do not charge audience for viewing the 
shows, and (3) the audience ratings shares are determined by program genre and quality, with the level of 
quality corresponding to the amount invested into production.  
4 See Appendix I for calculation details. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
  I present the proof in Appendix II. Graphically, Figure 1 illustrates the regions 
representing the three equilibria. The co-location strategy equilibrium only occurs at the 
top region of the graph where     
 
 
      
        and the differentiation strategy prevails 
everywhere else. It is clear that holding    constant in the top region, there exists an upper 
bound    beyond which co-location is no longer the equilibrium strategy. It is also clear 
that, holding θ constant, there exists a lower bound    below which co-location is no 
longer the equilibrium strategy. I state the model prediction below and present the related 
hypotheses in the next section along with the empirical context: 
 
Prediction 1:  All else equal, the likelihood of a channel choosing the 
differentiation strategy increases with the ability of the rival 
channel. 
 
Prediction 2:  All else equal, the likelihood of a channel choosing the 
differentiation strategy decreases with increasing market size ratio 
between program genre segments.  
 
 
 
 Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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3. Industry Background 
3.1 Industry Overview
5 
Television in China began in 1958 when the central government started broadcasting 
around the Beijing area on which is now known as the China Central Television, or 
CCTV. Nevertheless, it was not until the 1980’s and more so in the 90’s when the general 
public began to own television sets that the television industry took off. In 2005, 97.9 
percent of urban Chinese households owned at least one television set. It is estimated that 
the television medium reaches over 95.3% of the Chinese population. Television 
watching is one of the nation’s favorite pastimes. In 2005, an average Chinese spend 174 
minutes watching television per day (compared to 155 minutes for an average American 
in 2006
6). Primetime is between 7:00pm and 10:00pm with television audience ratings 
above 40%. 
The Chinese television industry is comprised of three tiers of television stations. 
The top tier is occupied by the China Central Television (CCTV) which is owned by the 
central government. The second tier consists of 31 provincial stations which are owned 
by the province-level governments. The third tier consists of the local stations owned by 
municipality, prefecture and county-level governments. Each television station operates 
one or more channels. For example, CCTV currently operates 20 channels (with CCTV1 
being their flagship channel) and the Shanghai station operates 13. In 2004, there were 
314 television stations in China carrying 2,389 channels.  
 
                                                 
5 The information in this section, unless specified otherwise, is based on China TV Rating Yearbook from 
2003 to 2006. 
6 “Special Report: America by the Numbers”, Time Magazine (p.44), November 26, 2007 Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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3.2 Satellite Channels 
In the late 1980’s a number of television stations in China’s mountainous southwestern 
provinces began using satellite communications technology to aid signal transmissions. 
Satellite broadcasts remained mostly limited to local provincial and regional levels until 
2001 when the central government issued to each provincial television station a national 
satellite channel license. These thirty-one provincial satellite channels together with the 
CCTV channels form the national television industry. 
Unlike in the U.S. and European countries where households install their own 
satellite dish, local cable companies aggregate the contents from the satellite channels 
together with those from CCTV and local stations and distribute the signals to households 
via cable. A typical household in urban China receives the CCTV channels, the satellite 
channels, the local provincial channels, and the local municipal channels. In 2002, the 
national broadcasters (i.e. CCTV and satellite channels) and local broadcasters (local 
province and municipal channels) split the audience shares almost evenly. Satellite 
channels take up approximately 16% of overall television viewership, or about one third 
of the national broadcast market share. Of all the national channels, CCTV1 alone takes 
up about 30 percent of the national market share. 
The satellite channels are regulated by the State Administration of Radio, Film 
and Television (SARFT) which is under the State Council. SARFT reviews and approves 
the content of television programs. Channels have autonomy in selecting programs from 
the approved list for broadcast. Television programs are either produced in-house or are 
acquired from external producers.
7 Typically, programs that contain time-sensitive or 
                                                 
7 I reviewed several program television broadcast rights acquisition contracts and discussed the negotiation 
process with a with a program distributor. In addition to the financial terms, the terms on the period of Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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regional specific contents (e.g. news reports and contemporary issues programs) are 
produced in-house while others (e.g. television drama and documentaries) are acquired 
externally. One of the most popular program genres is television drama series. In 2003, 
the drama genre received 28.1 percent of the total national television audience share. 
Unlike in the U.S., where evening television drama series are shown once a week on a 
particular day (e.g. Grey’s Anatomy is shown on ABC on Thursdays), Chinese drama 
series are of finite length (usually between 20 to 40 episodes) and are shown in sequence 
every weekday or every day in a given timeslot until the all episodes have been aired. 
Afterwards a new drama series begins. Every month the satellite channels are required to 
report to SARFT their programming lineups for the following month. There is only one 
program – the national evening news – which CCTV1 and all satellite channels (except 
Shanghai) are required to simulcast daily from 7pm to 7:30pm.  
Financially, the satellite channels are receiving diminishing financial supports 
from the province-level governments and are increasingly relying on advertising 
revenues. The New York Times reports that “government support for Chinese television is 
dwindling, creating a burst of commercialism as stations compete for viewers and 
advertising dollars.”
8  In 2005, satellite channels total advertising revenue reached 
CNY37.4 billion. In my interviews with television channel managers, they expressed that 
during the sample period the advertisers were more concerned about the size of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
broadcast dates, the time of day to broadcast and the number of repeat broadcasts are commonly negotiated 
between the program rights holder and the broadcaster.  
8 “Upstart from Chinese Province Masters the Art of TV Titillation”, New York Times, Nov 25, 2005. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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audience than the composition of the audience. This suggests that objective of the 
television channel is to maximize the overall ratings of their channels.
9 
 
3.3 CCTV1 Programming Shift 
In May 2003, CCTV1 underwent a major overhaul of its programming lineup. The shift 
in CCTV1’s programming strategy was a direct result of a central government policy 
change that was intended to modernize the management of the television enterprise.
10 
Traditionally, CCTV served as an important apparatus in disseminating government 
information to the public (Shambaugh 2007). With the overhaul, CCTV1 introduced 
more television drama and entertainment shows while retaining a portion of its original 
programming. Although CCTV1 announced the intention to revamp its programming in 
February 2003, details of the new lineup were kept secret until April 2003.
11  
 
3.4 Hypothesis 
From the model, Prediction 1 states that the less able players are more likely to 
differentiate from more the able players. In the Chinese satellite television industry, the 
satellite channels are distinctly less able than CCTV1. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
                                                 
9 The author learned from a former manager at CNBC Beijing that CNBC attempted to pitch programming 
sales to Chinese television stations by emphasizing their wealthier audience profile. But at the time 
CNBC’s approach received little interest from the television stations, which were more interested in 
maximizing raw ratings. This attitude has slowly changed in recent years as audience characteristics are 
receiving more attention from the television stations. 
10 A New York Times article described CCTV as ‘a model of how the Communist Party in China manages 
to keep state-owned companies profitable as it moves the nation toward a market economy with less 
government influence.’ “Olympics are Ratings Bonanza for Chinese TV”, New York Times, August 22, 
2008. More details about the policy is described in Appendix III. 
11 An article by Guangdong TV station dated  May 2004 indicates that the province-level channel did not 
learn about the specific details of CCTV1’s new programming schedule until April 2003. 
(http://www.gdtv.cn/newpage/dabenying/wspd2/news.asp?NewsID=21811&page=46) Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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Hypothesis 1a:  Satellite channels differentiate their programming genres from 
that of CCTV1. 
 
Heterogeneity in abilities exists even among the satellite channels. This is 
reflected by the channels’ operational performance, namely, their audience ratings shares. 
If the difference in ability is a significant determinant of a satellite channel’s positioning 
strategy, then a more able competitor to CCTV1 should be less influenced by CCTV1’s 
programming decision compared to a less able one. Formally stated: 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Less able satellite channels exhibit higher degree of 
differentiation from CCTV1 than more able satellite channels. 
   
Prediction 2 relates market characteristics to spatial competition strategy. To test 
this prediction, I exploit the variations in audience characteristics across different times 
of the day. Recall that in the model, β represents the market size ratio between program 
genres. I argue that in the Chinese television industry context the value of β is greater in 
the evening than in daytime. The reason is as follows. Consider two program genres: a 
common denominator program (e.g. a game show) which every member at home (say, 
the father, mother, child, grandfather and grandmother) will watch if their preferred 
substitute genres are not available (Beebe 1977, Spence and Owen 1977); and a niche 
program (e.g. a Chinese opera) which is most preferred by only one member (the 
grandmother) but that the rest will not watch television at all. In this case, β is directly 
related to the number of persons at home at a given time. During the day, only the Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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grandfather and the grandmother stay at home. If the television set is tuned into the game 
show, both grandparents will watch (2 persons watch the show). If the grandmother gets 
her way and watches the Chinese opera, then the grandfather takes a nap (only 1 person 
watches the show). So the audience size ration between the shows (β) is 2. In the evening 
when everyone is at home (5 persons), the audience ratio of the game show and the 
Chinese opera becomes 5 to 1, or a β value of 5. Therefore, βevening is greater than βdaytime. 
Prediction 2 argues that as β increases, all else equal, the likelihood of the channels 
adopting a differentiation strategy decreases. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:   Satellite channels exhibit lesser degree of differentiation from 
CCTV1 in the evening than in the daytime. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data Sources 
My primary dataset contains complete daily programming lineups from 8 am to midnight 
for 30 satellite channels and CCTV1 from November 2002 to October 2003.
12  The 
CCTV1 programming shift took place at the seventh month of the sample period. My 
dataset includes the program title, the channel and date of broadcast, the start and end 
time of the show, and the category under which the show is classified. A sample lineup of 
primetime programming for CCTV1, Hunan satellite channel and Shanghai satellite 
channel are presented in Tables 1a to 1c. Note that, unlike television programming in the 
US, Chinese television channels do not exactly follow hourly or half-hourly program 
                                                 
12 This includes all province-level satellite channels except Tibet satellite channel. The data for Tibet was 
unavailable to the author. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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slots. For instance, between 9 pm and 10 pm, CCTV1 airs a news program from 21:00 to 
21:20 and a documentary from 21:24 to 21:53, while Shanghai satellite channel 
broadcasts a drama from 21:15 to 21:53 followed by a music video from 21:53 to 21:59, 
and Hunan satellite channel broadcasts a news program from 21:34 to 21:56 that is 
preceded by a drama. 
 
  [Insert Tables 1a-c about here] 
 
The second dataset contains 15-minute timeslot monthly average ratings of the 30 
satellite channels in all provincial capital cities (except Lhasa). The programming lineups 
and ratings datasets are collected by CSM Market Research (CSM) using peoplemeter 
panels.
13 The ratings data are generated through stratified sampling drawn proportionally 
to their incidence in the population. The CSM peoplemeter is an electronic device similar 
to the ones used by Nielsen Media Research in the U.S. Attached to the television set, the 
peoplemeter records the minute-by-minute viewing behavior of each member in a 
household. These proprietary programming lineups and ratings datasets are considered 
reliable and are widely used by Chinese television stations, advertisers and government 
regulators (Yuan and Webster 2006).  
 
4.2 Constructing Spatial Distance Measurement 
The dataset classifies each program into one of 87 categories, such as domestic drama, 
foreign movies, weather report, etc. I measure the spatial distance between two channels’ 
programming as the angle between their portfolio vectors in orthogonal dimensions of 
                                                 
13 CSM Media Research (www.csm.com.cn) is subsidiary of the TNS Group (http://www.tnsglobal.com). Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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product space.
14 Specifically, I calculate the spatial distance between channels A and B 
using vector dot product: 
 
                      cos                          ·                       
                                                                 
 
As a stylized example, assume there are only two categories of television 
programs – sports and drama. Say, in the 8:00 pm to 8:15 pm timeslot in January 2003 (a 
total of 31 days x 15 min/day x 60 sec/min = 27900 seconds of air time), A broadcasts 
9300 seconds (5 minutes per day) of sports and 18600 seconds (10 minutes per day) of 
drama while B broadcasts 18600 seconds of sports and 9300 seconds of drama. The 
programming portfolio vectors for A and B will be [9300 18600] and [18600 9300], 
respectively. Using the vector dot product equation, I calculate the angle between the two 
channels’ programming portfolio vectors. The angle ranges from zero to 1.5708, or π/2, 
radians. An angle of zero radians indicates that the two channels broadcast exactly the 
same categories of shows, while an angle of π/2 radians indicates the two channels 
broadcast shows of completely different categories. In this example, the angle between A 
and B is 0.6435 radians.  
In terms of program repositioning, continuing with the above example, if A 
increases it sports content from 5 to 6 minutes per day (leaving only 9 minutes per day 
for drama) while B’s lineup remains unchanged, then the distance between A and B will 
decrease by 0.124 radians. Note that the conversion from minutes of program air time to 
radians in spatial distance is nonlinear. At the mean, with the distance between a satellite 
                                                 
14 This method of spatial distance measure construction is similar in concept to Sweeting (2006), Crawford 
(2007) and Chisholm et al. (2006). Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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channel and CCTV1 at approximately 1.22 radians, a programming change of one minute 
per day in a 15-minute timeslot will result in a change in spatial distance by 
approximately 0.1 radians.
15 
 
4.3 Identification Approach 
The literature discusses three spatial strategies – stay close, differentiate and maintain 
distances from competitors. To illustrate my identification of these three strategies, let’s 
consider the following two examples. First, Figure 2a plots the distance between 
Shanghai satellite channel and CCTV1 in the 1:30-1:45 pm timeslot from November 
2002 to October 2003. Before the CCTV1 programming shift in May 2003, the distance 
between Shanghai channel and CCTV1 is fairly stable. In May 2003, CCTV1 replaces a 
news talk show with a television drama at the timeslot in which Shanghai channel at the 
time also broadcasts a drama. This increase in the overlap of programming genre is 
reflected by a drop in spatial distance between the two channels. Shanghai channel 
changes its programming over the next few months. In October 2003, Shanghai channel 
airs a home shopping show in this timeslot. The second example shows the case where 
CCTV1 moves away from a satellite channel. Figure 2b plots the spatial distance between 
Hainan satellite channel and CCTV1 in the 10:00-10:15am timeslot. At 10:00 am, the 
former channel broadcasts a 5-minute news program which overlaps with the latter’s 
morning news program prior to the shift. In May 2003, CCTV1 cancels its morning news 
program and replaces it with a drama. This change in programming is reflected by an 
                                                 
15 This approximation is valid for a 2 program category space. For 3 and 4 program genre spaces, a 
programming change of one minute per day results in 0.11 and 0.13 radians change, respectively. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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increase in spatial distance between the two channels. Note that Hainan channel does not 
reposition closer to CCTV1.  
 
  [Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
 
These two examples together illustrate a response pattern by satellite channels to 
CCTV1’s programming shift. In the first example CCTV1 moves closer to a satellite 
channel in programming space (negative distance shock, or negative shock) and the 
satellite channel subsequently moves away from CCTV1 (positive distance repositioning, 
or positive reposition); in the second example CCTV1 moves away from a satellite 
channel (positive distance shock, or positive shock) and the satellite channel does not 
reposition itself to reduce the distance from CCTV1 (negative reposition). This pattern of 
asymmetric repositioning is consistent with the differentiation strategy but contradicts the 
staying close or maintaining distance strategies. If the satellite channels were staying 
close to CCTV1, then a positive shock should be followed by a negative repositioning, 
and a negative shock should result in no positive repositioning. Similarly, if the satellite 
channels were maintaining distances from CCTV1, then a positive (negative) shock 
should result in a negative (positive) repositioning. Table 2 summarizes this argument. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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4.4 Dependent and Independent Variables 
To implement the identification approach described above, I organize the monthly 
channel programming observations according to four periods: November 2002 to January 
2003 (period p = -2), February 2003 to April 2003 (period p = -1), May 2003 to July 
2003 (period p = 0) and August 2003 to October 2004 (period p = 1). Mean values of 
observations are taken across the months within each period. Recall that the CCTV1 
programming shift occurs in May 2003 (period p = 0). 
  The unit of observation is channel-timeslot. The dependent variable is Repositionij 
which measures the change in spatial distance by channel i with respect to CCTV1 in 
timeslot j subsequent to the CCTV1 programming shift (i.e. between periods p = 0 and p 
= 1.) A positive (negative) Repositionij value indicates an increase (decrease) in distance 
between channel i and CCTV1 in timeslot j. The key independent variable is Shockij 
which measures the change in distance between channel i and CCTV1 in timeslot j 
between periods p = -1 and p = 0. A positive (negative) Shockij value indicates an 
increase (decrease) in the distance between channel i and CCTV1 in timeslot j. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, the direction of Shock plays an essential role in the 
identification process. Therefore, I separate Shockij by PositiveShockij (when CCTV1 
moves away from satellite channel i in timeslot j) and NegativeShockij (when CCTV1 
moves towards satellite channel i in timeslot j). Next, to test Hypothesis 1b, I include 
interaction terms between Shockij, PositiveShockij and NegativeShockij with Ratingsij 
which measures the audience ratings shares received by satellite channel i in timeslot j 
during period p = -1. Finally, to test Hypothesis 2, I include interaction terms between Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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Shockij, PositiveShockij and NegativeShockij with PrimeTimej which is a dummy variable 
with value of 1 if timeslot j falls between 7:30pm and 10:00pm, and zero otherwise. 
I include several control variables. SpatialTrendij is a control variable which 
captures distance trends prior to the CCTV1 programming shift.  If a satellite channel has 
been executing a pre-existing spatial strategy towards CCTV1 prior to the shock, this 
control variable will help to capture this effect. Specifically, SpatialTrendij measures the 
change in distance between channel i and CCTV1 in timeslot j between periods p = -2 
and p = -1. In practice, television channels replace shows when they receive low ratings. 
RatingsChangeij is a control variable that captures changes in ratings share received by 
channel i in timeslot j following the CCTV1 programming shift, i.e. between periods p = 
-1 and p = 0. RatingsTrendij is a control variable that captures the trend in ratings share 
changes received by channel i in timeslot j between periods p = -2 and p = -1. Finally, I 
include channel and timeslot fixed effects associated with satellite channel i and timeslot 
j, respectively. These fixed effects capture the time invariant unobservable characteristics 
of channels and the timeslots. Tables 3 and 4 present the summary statistics and pair-wise 
correlations of the variables. Since SARFT requires that all satellite channels (except 
Shanghai) to simulcast the daily evening news report together with CCTV1 between 7:00 
pm and 7:30 pm, the satellite channels have no autonomy in deciding their programming 
during this time. I therefore exclude these timeslots in my natural experiment. The 
number of observations is 1,860 channel-timeslot.
16 
 
 
                                                 
16 30 satellite channels x 16 hours per day x 4 timeslots per hour yields 1,920 channel-timeslot observations. 
Subtract the two timeslots between 7:00 pm and 7:30 pm for all satellite channels yields 1,860 channel-
timeslot observations. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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4.5 Econometric Model 
4.5.1 Panel Analysis 
I run the following regression to estimate the difference between CCTV1-satellite and 
satellite-satellite distances. 
  Distanceijm = α + λ0 CCTV1i + γ0 interactionij + ΦFEjm + εijm    (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the average spatial distance (in radians) between 
channel i and all other satellite channels in timeslot j during year-month m. The dummy 
variable CCTV1 is equal to 1 when channel i is CCTV1 and is set to zero otherwise. The 
interaction term is between CCTV1 and Primetime which is a dummy variable of value 1 
if timeslot j falls between 7:30 pm to 10:00 pm. The interaction term is used for 
estimating the effect of the evening primetime market on spatial distance. I include 
timeslot and year-month fixed effects. 
The panel analysis is susceptible to bias due to potential unobserved factors. For 
example, if CCTV1 carries a political agenda while the satellite channels pursue 
commercial objectives, then the difference in spatial distance will reflect their difference 
in objectives rather than difference is abilities. To alleviate this issue, I turn to the natural 
experiment analysis. 
 
4.5.2 Natural Experiment Analysis 
I employ an OLS model to test the spatial competition hypothesis (H1a): 
 
Repositionij = α + λ1 Shockij + Γ Controlsij + Φ Fixed Effectsij + εij         (2) 
 
I expect the coefficient for Shock (λ1) to be negative. However, a negative λ1 is only a 
necessary but insufficient support of Hypothesis 1a, as it is also consistent with the Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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strategy of maintaining distance. In order to pinpoint the spatial strategy, I modify 
Equation (2) by replacing Shock with PositiveShock and NegativeShock. A non-negative 
(or statistically insignificant) coefficient for PositiveShock coupled with a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for NegativeShock will identify the differentiation 
strategy. 
To test Hypothesis 1b, I run the the following OLS model: 
Repositionij = α + λ1 Shockij + λ2 Shockij*Ratingsij + Γ Controlsij  
+ Φ Fixed Effectsij + εij                 (3) 
 
Similar to testing Hypothesis 1a, I separate Shock into PositiveShock and NegativeShock. 
I proxy channel capability using the audience ratings share in the pre-CCTV1 program 
shift era (period p=-1). Theory predicts that, condition on the magnitude of Shock, 
satellite channel i will demonstrate smaller (greater) magnitude of repositioning if it 
receives strong (poor) ratings in a timeslot j. This prediction will be supported if 
λ2 carries an opposite sign to the λ1. 
Finally, to test Hypothesis H2, the specification I estimate is: 
Repositionij = α + λ1 Shockij + λ3 Shockij*PrimeTimej + Γ Controlsij  
+ Φ Fixed Effectsij + εij                 (4) 
 
The empirical interpretation is analogous to that of Hypothesis 1b. Theory predicts that, 
conditioned on the magnitude of Shock, reposition activities will be smaller in evening 
timeslots. This prediction will be supported if the λ3  carries an opposite sign to λ1. 
 
 
 Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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6. Results 
In this section, I first present the panel analysis results followed by the natural experiment 
results. 
 
6.1 Panel Analysis 
Figure 3a plots the raw data that compares average spatial distances between CCTV1 and 
satellite channels. In every month the average CCTV1-satellite distance is greater than 
the average satellite-satellite distance. This difference is significant at the 95% level for 
all months except during the three-month period immediately after the CCTV1 
programming change (May to July 2003). The results are similar when average distances 
from the nearest three channels are compared (Figure 3b).  
I run equation (1) to estimate the difference between CCTV1-satellite and 
satellite-satellite distances. Table 5 shows the regression results. The dependent variable 
in panel A is the average spatial distance relative to all satellite channel neighbors. 
Column A1 shows that, when compared to their distance with peers, satellite channels 
distance themselves an additional 0.155 radians further from CCTV1, representing a 
difference of 14.6 percent (0.155/1.062=0.146). Column A2 includes year-month and 
timeslot fixed effects and the regression result changes to 11.6 percent 
(0.155/1.338=0.116). The result is consistent with Hypothesis 1a. Column A3 shows that 
the difference in distance drops significantly in primetime timeslots between 7:30 pm to 
10:00 pm. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The same set of regressions is 
repeated using average spatial distance relative to the nearest three satellite channel Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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neighbors, and the results are presented in panel B. Again, the results are consistent with 
the hypotheses. 
 
6.2 Satellite Channel Repositioning Analysis 
6.2.1 Heterogeneous Ability and Firm Strategy 
Table 6 presents results of the test of Hypothesis 1a using the natural experiment. The 
coefficient for Shock is negative, indicating that satellite channels relocate their spatial 
positions in the opposite direction in response to CCTV1. With no control variables and 
fixed effects, the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant. However, by 
including channel and timeslot fixed effects in column 2, both the coefficient’s 
magnitude and statistical significance are increased. In columns 3 to 5, I include pre-
policy spatial trends and ratings data as controls. The coefficient retains the negative sign 
and the statistical significance. The parameter estimate of Shock (-0.087) in column 5 
reflects that when CCTV1 overlaps one more (less) minute of programming with a 
satellite channel per day in a 15-minute timeslot, the satellite channel will reposition itself 
to reduce (increase) the overlap by approximately 5.2 seconds. Table 7 presents the 
results of a robustness test that addresses any concerns about whether adjacent timeslots 
are independent. I subsample the data using only one quarter (15-minute timeslot) per 
hour. The coefficients for Shock retain the negative sign in all cases with statistical 
significance at the 5% level for the second and third quarter hour and at 10% level for the 
first and fourth quarter hour. The results remain robust. 
  Recall that a negative coefficient for Shock is a necessary but insufficient 
identification of the differentiation strategy as it is also consistent with the maintaining Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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distance strategy (Section 4.3). To pinpoint the identification, I separate the variable 
Shock by PositiveShock and NegativeShock. When CCTV1 moves away (approaches) a 
satellite channel in the programming space, I consider it a positive (negative) shock. 
Table 8 presents the results. The results in column 1 show the signs for PositiveShock and 
NegativeShock are positive and negative, respectively. This indicates that channels 
respond to positive (negative) shocks by subsequently repositioning closer to (away 
from) CCTV1, suggesting that satellite channels move away from CCTV1 regardless of 
the direction. However, when fixed effects and control variables are added to the 
regression model, the coefficient for PositiveShock loses statistical significance while the 
coefficient for NegativeShock gains both economic and statistical significance. This 
suggests that the satellite channels, rather than maintaining distances from CCTV1, 
differentiate from CCTV1. The parameter estimate of NegativeShock (-0.144) in column 
5 implies that when CCTV1 increases program genre overlap with a satellite channel by 
one additional minute per day, the satellite channel will reposition itself to reduce the 
overlap by approximately 8.7 seconds. 
Table 9 presents results of the test of Hypothesis 1b. The key independent 
variable is the interaction between Ratings and Shock. For a given Shock, a satellite 
channel generating higher ratings in a timeslot is predicted by theory to demonstrate a 
lower level of response than a channel with a lower ratings share. Therefore, Hypothesis 
1b predicts that the coefficient for the interaction term to have an opposite sign to the 
Shock coefficient. Columns 1-3 present the results with Shock while columns 4-6 present 
the results with Shock separated into PositiveShock and NegativeShock. From column 1, 
the coefficient of the key independent variable is found to be significant and of the Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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predicted sign. However, it becomes insignificant when fixed effects and controls are 
included in columns 2 and 3. When Shock is separated into PositiveShock and 
NegativeShock, results presented in columns 4-6 show that the interaction term is 
significant with NegativeShock but not with PositiveShock. Moreover, the sign associated 
with the interaction term coefficient has the predicted sign. These results support 
Hypothesis 1b. The economic implication of the coefficient can be illustrated by the 
following example. A one minute increase in program overlap by CCTV1 will cause a 
satellite channel receiving the average rating share to reduce programming overlap by 
approximately 8.9 seconds. For the same shock, the overlap will only be approximately 
6.9 seconds if the channel had received a ratings share of one standard deviation above 
the mean. 
 
6.3 Market Environment and Firm Strategy 
Table 10 presents results of the test of Hypothesis 2. The key independent variable is the 
interaction term between Primetime and Shock. Hypothesis 2 predicts that, for a given 
Shock, a lower level of differentiation response is expected during primetime. Therefore, 
I expect the coefficient for the interaction term to have an opposite sign to the Shock 
coefficient. The regression results support Hypothesis 2. Column 6 shows the full 
regression model result with separate PositiveShock, NegativeShock, and separate 
interaction terms with Primetime. The coefficients for PositiveShock and Primetime x 
PositiviteShock are statistically insignificant, while the coefficients for NegativeShock 
and Primetime x NegativeShock are statistically significant and carry the expected signs. 
The economic implication of the coefficient can be illustrated by the following example. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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A one minute increase in program overlap by CCTV1 during non-primetime will cause a 
satellite channel receiving the average rating share to reduce programming overlap by 
approximately 10.4 seconds. If a shock of the same magnitude takes place in primetime, 
the overlap will only be approximately 0.54 seconds. The results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This study presents a model of firms positioning themselves in product space with respect 
to their more able rivals. The model predicts that two rivals will (1) more likely to 
differentiate their products when the gap between their abilities is large, and (2) less 
likely to differentiate when the market size ratio between product segments is large. I test 
these predictions in the Chinese satellite television industry, which is occupied by a 
dominant incumbent and thirty-one entrants. The results are consistent with the model 
predictions. Specifically, I find that the entrants position themselves approximately 12 to 
15 percent further away from the incumbent than from peers. By exploiting a natural 
experiment induced by a government policy change that led the incumbent to shift its 
programming lineup, I find the entrants reposition their programming in a manner that is 
consistent with the differentiation strategy but contradicts the staying close and 
maintaining distance strategies. I also find that the weakest entrants are most responsive 
to the incumbent’s programming shift. Finally, I examine how market environments 
influence spatial strategy and find that the entrants differentiate less in the evening when 
the market size ratio between product segments is larger than during daytime. Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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This study is not without limitations. First, my dataset contains only government-
owned broadcasters. State-owned enterprises may not respond to market competitive 
forces as diligently as private firms do (World Bank 1995). In China, however, the 
provincial governments have reduced financial support to their satellite channels, leading 
the channels to compete for viewers and advertising revenues.
17 Furthermore, a study of 
media ownership in 97 countries finds that almost universally the largest media firms are 
owned by the government or by private families, and government ownership is 
particularly more pervasive in broadcasting media (Djankov 2003). Outside of the U.S., 
government ownership of media broadcasters is nearer to the norm than an exception. 
Given that in this study I do find strategic positioning behaviors among state-owned 
media enterprises, I expect strategic maneuvering activities by commercial firms to be 
even more pronounced.  
The second limitation of this study is that I have only focused on the pairwise 
competitions between individual entrants and the incumbent. Since the entrants are likely 
to also take into consideration the actions of their peers, the process of determining the 
spatial locations of each player ought to be more complex than the one modeled in this 
study. Future research can explore strategic interactions between the satellite channels. 
For example, the literature on imitation strategy argues that under uncertain 
environments, such as the circumstance facing the satellite channels when CCTV1 
revamped its product portfolio, firms tend to imitate one another (e.g. Banerjee 1992). It 
will be interesting to test the imitation theory by examining whether the satellite 
channels, when differentiating from CCTV1, cluster among themselves in product spatial 
locations.  
                                                 
17 “Upstart from Chinese Province Masters the Art of TV Titillation”, The New York Times, Nov 25, 2005 Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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This study contributes to a richer understanding of a canonical competitive 
strategy – differentiation – by examining a set of conditions under which rivals exhibit 
different degrees of differentiation. In addition to addressing the current limitations, 
future work can pursue topics such as how dynamic positioning play a role in other 
strategic decisions like new product launch, and how repositioning activities affect 
performance outcomes. 
   Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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Appendix I. Equilibrium Profits Calculation 
The profits for each channel when they co-locate are 
            
  
     
               
            
  
     
               
where qi is the quality of their shows, ci is the cost of production and β is the scaling 
factor for the genre. Substitute q1= θc1 and q2 = c2 where θ ∈ (1, 2) 
            
   
      
                
            
  
      
                
Taking first order conditions for each channel’s profit with respect to their costs and 
solving simultaneously yields  
          
          
           and      
          
         
Substituting the equilibrium costs into the profit functions gives the equilibrium profits 
           
 
    
       
           and       
 
    
      
       
The profits for each channel when they do not co-locate are 
                        and         √        
Taking first order conditions for each channel’s profit with respect to their costs yields  
            
   
      and        
  
   
Finally, substituting the equilibrium costs into the profit functions gives the equilibrium 
profits 
             
   
     and        
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Appendix II. Proof of Proposition 
Proof Condition (1): Suppose     
 
 
      
         
For channels to co-locate in the more attractive genre requires that 
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which yields the set of conditions 
            
 
 
      
            
and 
            
 
 
      
        
It is readily verified that 
        1  
 
 
      
         
 
 
      
        
for θ ∈ (1, 2). Thus, if      
 
 
      
        , neither channel can profitably deviate by 
differentiating from the more attractive genre. To see that this is the unique equilibrium, 
notice that if the channels did not co-locate, the channel broadcasting the less attractive 
genre could profitably switch to the more attractive genre. Finally, if channels co-locate 
in the less attractive genre, then either channel could profitably deviate to become the 
monopolist in the more attractive genre. 
 
  Condition (2): Suppose  
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Co-location in either market is not an equilibrium since the weaker channel can 
profitably deviate to the unoccupied genre. To see that the weaker channel cannot 
monopolize the more attractive genre, notice that the stronger channel could profitably 
deviate by co-locating there since 
 
 
      
            . Thus, the only equilibrium is that 
identified in the proposition. 
 
  Condition (3): Suppose      
 
 
      
         
Since     
 
 
      
        , neither channel finds it profitable to co-locate in a genre. 
To see that the weaker channel can monopolize the more attractive genre, notice that the 
stronger channel cannot profitably deviate from the less attractive genre to co-locate with 
the weaker channel. At the same time, the weaker channel cannot profitably deviate to the 
less attractive genre. The proof is similar for the case where the stronger channel 
monopolizes the more attractive genre.   
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Appendix III.  Details of the Central Government Policy Change 
 
At the 16
th Party Congress on November 8 2002, Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
announced a macro reform plan of the Chinese cultural industry. The following is an 
excerpt of the official English translation published in the People’s Daily on Nov 18 
2002:  
 
“It is necessary to push forward cultural restructuring in light of the characteristics of 
the development of socialist spiritual civilization and laws governing it and in response 
to the needs of the growing socialist market economy. We must lose no time in working 
out overall planning for cultural restructuring. We must integrate the deepening of 
reform with structural adjustment and promotion of development and straighten out the 
relationship between the government and cultural enterprises and institutions. We must 
build up a legal system concerning culture and intensify macro-control. We should 
deepen the internal reform of cultural enterprises and institutions and gradually establish 
a management system and operational mechanism favorable to arousing the initiative of 
cultural workers, encouraging innovation and bringing forth more top-notch works and 
more outstanding personnel. In compliance with the principle of both enriching culture 
and intensifying management, we should improve the system of markets for cultural 
products and their management mechanism to create a social climate favorable for a 
flourishing socialist culture.” 
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Table 1a-c Sample Primetime Programming Lineup 
Wednesday January 15 2003 7:00pm – 11:00pm 
 
 
Table 1a CCTV1 
 
Title  Start  End  Category 
National News  19:00:00  19:30:00  General News 
Commercials  19:30:00  19:31:05  Commercials 
Weather Forecast  19:31:05  19:35:20  Weather Forecast 
Commercials  19:35:20  19:38:50  Commercials 
Jiaodian Interview  19:38:50  19:50:50  News Commentary 
Commercials  19:50:50  19:57:40  Commercials 
Technology Expo  19:57:40  20:02:10  General Science 
Commercials  20:02:10  20:04:00  Commercials 
Da Shi  20:04:00  20:54:02  Domestic Drama 
Commercials  20:54:02  21:00:05  Commercials 
Xianzaibobao  21:00:05  21:20:00  General News 
Commercials  21:20:00  21:22:45  Commercials 
Program Guide  21:22:45  21:23:45  Program Guide 
Commercials  21:23:45  21:24:20  Commercials 
Around the World  21:24:20  21:53:45  Documentary Others 
Program Guide  21:53:45  21:54:45  Program Guide 
Commercials  21:54:45  22:00:00  Commercials 
World Report  22:00:00  22:17:00  General News 
Commercials  22:17:00  22:20:00  Commercials 
Nightly News  22:20:00  22:30:00  General News 
Commercials  22:30:00  22:32:00  Commercials 
Sports News  22:32:00  22:42:00  Sports News 
Commercials  22:42:00  22:47:00  Commercials 
Weather Forecast  22:47:00  22:52:00  Weather Forecast 
Commercials  22:52:00  22:56:00  Commercials 
Program Guide  22:56:00  22:57:00  Program Guide 
 
 
 
 
Note: The original dataset contains title and category data in Chinese   Spatial Competition among Heterogeneous Firms 
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Table 1b Hunan Satellite Channel 
 
Title  Start  End  Category 
National News  19:00:00  19:30:00  General News 
Commercials  19:30:00  19:33:00  Commercials 
2003 NPC & CPPCC Conference  19:33:00  19:38:04  News Commentary 
Commercials  19:38:04  19:42:18  Commercials 
Qinshenshen Yumengmeng   19:42:18  20:35:35  Domestic Drama 
Commercials  20:35:35  20:40:29  Commercials 
Qinshenshen Yumengmeng  20:40:29  21:29:01  Domestic Drama 
Commercials  21:29:01  21:34:49  Commercials 
Nightly News  21:34:49  21:56:00  General News 
Xindongli Xinfazhan  21:56:00  22:10:59  Interview 
Commercials  22:10:59  22:15:16  Commercials 
Weather Station  22:15:16  22:17:46  Weather Forecast 
Commercials  22:17:46  22:18:54  Commercials 
Heibing  22:18:54  23:15:45  Domestic Drama 
 
 
Table 1c Shanghai Satellite Channel 
 
Title  Start  End  Category 
Nightly Sports News  19:00:00  19:30:00  Sports News 
Commercials  19:30:00  19:33:00  Commercials 
Renzai Shanghai  19:33:00  19:57:00  Documentary 
Commercials  19:57:00  20:00:00  Commercials 
Shanghai Satellite Channel News  20:00:00  20:27:50  General News 
Commercials  20:27:50  20:28:20  Commercials 
Weather Forecast  20:28:20  20:30:00  Weather Forecast 
Commercials  20:30:00  20:34:25  Commercials 
Dafuqingzhai  20:34:25  21:13:10  Domestic Drama 
Commercials  21:13:10  21:15:45  Commercials 
Dafuqingzhai  21:15:45  21:53:45  Domestic Drama 
Song of the Week  21:53:45  21:59:00  Music Others 
News At Ten  21:59:00  22:23:02  Foreign Language News 
Commercials  22:23:02  22:26:01  Commercials 
Weather Forecast  22:26:01  22:27:00  Weather Forecast 
Commercials  22:27:00  22:30:00  Commercials 
Nightline News  22:30:00  23:09:27  General News 
 
 
 
 
 Note: The original dataset contains title and category data in Chinese 
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Table 2 Natural Experiment Identification Approach 
 
 
 
 
Spatial Strategy  CCTV1 Spatial Shock  Reposition 
     
Maintain Distance  Increased Distance  Decrease distance 
  Decreased Distance  Increase distance 
     
Stay Close  Increased Distance  Decrease distance 
  Decreased Distance  Not increase distance 
     
Differentiate  Increased Distance  Not decrease distance 
  Decreased Distance  Increase distance 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable  Definition  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 
Repositionij 
 
Change in spatial distance between channel i and CCTV1 in timeslot j between 
periods p = 0 and p = 1 
1860  0.041  0.195  -1.489  1.102 
 
Shockij 
 
Change in distance between channel i and CCTV1 in timeslot j between 
periods p = -1 and p = 0 
1860  -0.148  0.422  -1.420  1.295 
 
PositiveShockij 
 
Equals Shockij if Shockij > 0, zero otherwise 
 
1860  0.067  0.137  0  1.295 
 
NegativeShockij 
 
Equals Shockij if Shockij < 0, zero otherwise 
 
1860  -0.215  0.362  -1.420  0 
 
Ratingsij 
 
Ratings share received by channel i in timeslot j during p = -1 
 
1860  0.646  0.845  0.005  11.019 
 
SpatialTrendij 
 
Change in distance between channel i and CCTV1 in timeslot j between 
periods p = -2 and p = -1 
1860  0.022  0.180  -0.919  1.227 
 
RatingsChangeij 
 
Change in ratings share received by channel i in timeslot j between periods  
p = -1 and p = 0 
1860  0.015  0.440  -5.519  1.911 
 
RatingsTrendij 
 
Change in ratings share received by channel i in timeslot j between periods  
p = -2 and p = -1 
1860  0.019  0.542  -1.781  7.971 
 
 
 
Note: 
Periods:   p = -2  November 2002 – January 2003 
p = -1  February 2003 – April 2003 
p = 0  May 2003 – July 2003 
p = 1  August 2003 – October 2003 
 
CCTV1 programming shift occurs in May 2003. 
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Table 4 Correlations Matrix 
 
 
  Reposition  Shock  PositiveShock  NegativeShock  Ratings  SpatialTrend  RatingsChange  RatingsTrend 
Reposition  1               
                 
Shock  -0.0376  1             
  (0.1047)               
                 
PositiveShock  0.0187  0.5717*  1           
  (0.4202)  (0.0000)             
                 
NegativeShock  -0.0510*  0.9506*  0.2888*  1         
  (0.0279)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)           
                 
Ratings  0.0606*  -0.1005*  -0.0265  -0.1072*  1       
  (0.0090)  (0.0000)  (0.2528)  (0.0000)         
                 
SpatialTrend  -0.0677*  -0.1969*  -0.1681*  -0.1662*  -0.0115  1     
  (0.0035)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.6191)       
                 
RatingsChange  0.0705*  -0.01147  0.0048  -0.0151  -0.3157*  -0.0147  1   
  (0.0023)  (0.6242)  (0.8371)  (0.5161)  (0.0000)  (0.5270)     
                 
RatingsTrend  -0.0341  -0.0087  -0.0171  -0.0037  0.6146*  0.0013  -0.6132*  1 
  (0.1418)  (0.7068)  (0.4615)  (0.8725)  (0.0000)  (0.9554)  (0.0000)   
 
 
SE in parentheses; * significant at 5% 
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Table 5 Panel Analysis: Satellite channels distance themselves further from CCTV1 compared to their peers 
 
Dependent Variable (Distance): 
  Panel A. Average spatial distance between channel i and all satellite channel neighbors in timeslot j in year-month m. 
  Panel B. Average spatial distance between channel i and the nearest three satellite channel neighbors in timeslot j in year-month m. 
 
Independent Variables: 
  PrimeTime = 1 if timeslot j falls between 7:30pm and 10:00pm, zero otherwise. 
  CCTV1 = 1 if the channel i is CCTV1, zero otherwise. 
 
Regression: 
  Distanceijm = α + λ0 CCTV1i + γ0 interactionij + ΦFEjm + εijm 
 
 
 
  Panel A    Panel B 
    (A1)  (A2)  (A3)    (B1)  (B2)  (B3) 
                 
CCTV1    0.155  0.155  0.179    0.177  0.177  0.205 
    (0.013)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***    (0.016)***  (0.014)***  (0.015)*** 
CCTV1*PrimeTime        -0.152        -0.178 
        (0.027)***        (0.034)*** 
                 
                 
PrimeTime    No  No  Absorbed    No  No  Absorbed 
YearMonth Fixed Effect    No  Yes  Yes    No  Yes  Yes 
Timeslot Fixed Effect    No  Yes  Yes    No  Yes  Yes 
                 
Constant    1.062  1.338  1.337    0.589  0.781  0.780 
    (0.002)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)***    (0.003)***  (0.028)***  (0.028)*** 
Observations    23808  23808  23808    23808  23808  23808 
R-squared    0.006  0.531  0.532    0.005  0.159  0.160 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
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Table 6 Test of Hypothesis 1a: Satellite channels differentiate from CCTV1 
 
Dependent Variable: Spatial distance repositioning by Satellite Channels with respect to CCTV1 
 
Full Sample 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Shock  -0.017  -0.076  -0.075  -0.087  -0.087 
  (0.013)  (0.034)**  (0.034)**  (0.033)**  (0.033)** 
           
Channel Fixed Effect  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Timeslot Fixed Effect  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RatingsChange  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SpatialTrend  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
RatingsTrend  No  No  No  No  Yes 
           
Observations  1860  1860  1860  1860  1860 
R-squared  0.001  0.295  0.296  0.304  0.304 
No. of SE Clusters  -  30  30  30  30 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE clustered by channels in (2)-(5)             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 7 Robustness test of Hypothesis 1a by subsamples 
 
Dependent Variable: Spatial distance repositioning by Satellite Channels with respect to CCTV1 
 
 
  (1) 
1
st quarter of each 
hour 
(2) 
2
nd quarter of each 
hour 
(3) 
3
rd quarter of each 
hour 
(4) 
4
th quarter of each 
hour 
         
Shock  -0.081  -0.126  -0.075  -0.067 
  (0.044)*  (0.049)**  (0.035)**  (0.036)* 
         
Channel Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Timeslot Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RatingsChange  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SpatialTrend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RatingsTrend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Observations  450  450  480  480 
R-squared  0.285  0.355  0.349  0.346 
No. of SE Clusters  30  30  30  30 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE clustered by channels             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 8 Test of Hypothesis 1a with positive and negative shocks 
 
Dependent Variable: Spatial distance repositioning by Satellite Channels with respect to CCTV1 
 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
PositiveShock  0.052  0.101  0.100  0.077  0.077 
  (0.032)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.062)  (0.063) 
NegativeShock  -0.033  -0.139  -0.138  -0.144  -0.144 
  (0.015)**  (0.042)***  (0.042)***  (0.043)***  (0.043)*** 
           
Channel Fixed Effect  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Timeslot Fixed Effect  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RatingsChange  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SpatialTrend  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
RatingsTrend  No  No  No  No  Yes 
           
           
Observations  1860  1860  1860  1860  1860 
R-squared  0.004  0.307  0.307  0.314  0.314 
No. of SE Clusters  -  30  30  30  30 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE clustered by channels in (2)-(5)             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
  
Table 9 Test of Hypothesis 1b: Stronger satellite channels less likely to differentiate from CCTV1 
 
Dependent Variable: Spatial distance repositioning by Satellite Channels with respect to CCTV1 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Shock  -0.026  -0.091  -0.095       
  (0.014)*  (0.035)**  (0.036)**       
Ratings x Shock  0.089  0.116  0.088       
  (0.031)***  (0.069)  (0.069)       
             
PositiveShock        0.024  0.102  0.097 
        (0.043)  (0.069)  (0.068) 
Ratings x PositiveShock        0.047  0.006  -0.029 
        (0.039)  (0.061)  (0.063) 
             
NegativeShock        -0.061  -0.163  -0.174 
        (0.020)***  (0.044)***  (0.044)*** 
Ratings x NegativeShock        0.037  0.032  0.043 
        (0.016)**  (0.016)*  (0.016)** 
             
Ratings  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Channel Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Timeslot Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
RatingsChange  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
SpatialTrend  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
RatingsTrend  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
             
Observations  1860  1860  1860  1860  1860  1860 
R-squared  0.008  0.300  0.309  0.011  0.310  0.320 
No. of SE Clusters  -  30  30  -  30  30 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE clustered by channels in (2),(3),(5),(6)             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 10 Test of Hypothesis 2: Satellite channels less likely to differentiate from CCTV1 in evening timeslots 
 
Dependent Variable: Spatial distance repositioning by Satellite Channels with respect to CCTV1 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Shock  -0.030  -0.102  -0.107       
  (0.016)*  (0.042)**  (0.043)**       
Primetime x Shock  0.036  0.112  0.100       
  (0.025)  (0.052)**  (0.054)*       
             
PositiveShock        0.074  0.108  0.084 
        (0.035)**  (0.065)  (0.060) 
Primetime x PositiveShock        -0.078  -0.094  -0.073 
        (0.089)  (0.159)  (0.158) 
             
NegativeShock        -0.055  -0.178  -0.173 
        (0.020)***  (0.054)***  (0.056)*** 
Primetime x NegativeShock        0.063  0.186  0.164 
        (0.030)**  (0.077)**  (0.079)** 
             
Primetime  Yes  absorbed  absorbed  Yes  absorbed  absorbed 
Channel Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Timeslot Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
RatingsChange  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
SpatialTrend  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
RatingsTrend  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
             
Observations  1860  1860  1860  1860  1860  1860 
R-squared  0.010  0.300  0.311  0.014  0.314  0.322 
No. of SE Clusters  -  30  30  -  30  30 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE clustered by channels in (2),(3),(5),(6)             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
Notes : 
1.  PrimeTime = 1 if timeslot j falls between 7:30pm and 10:00pm. Otherwise PrimeTime = 0. 
2.  Observations excluded if timeslot j falls between 7:00pm and 7:30pm during the simulcast of the national news. 
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Figure 1. Spatial Strategy Equilibria 
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Figure 2a. Graphical Illustration of CCTV1 Shock on Shanghai Satellite Channel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b. Graphical Illustration of CCTV1 Shock on Hainan Satellite Channel 
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Figure 3a. Raw Data Plot of Product Spatial Distance 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Raw Data Plot of Product Spatial Distance, Nearest 3 Satellite Channels 
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